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engrafts upon those concepts a socially desirable exception.
That it is undoubtedly true that a party should not be allowed to disregard the Commission, and place his case
for the first time before the law court cannot be doubted.
Such a procedure would negative the reason for the existence of the Commission. Parties should be required
to submit all of their available evidence in the first instance to the Administrative Board which has been created for the purpose of hearing such evidence. The Board
is thereby given an opportunity to function on the case
before the party appeals for a determination as to whether
it has decided the issues correctly, a procedure which
would be consistent with the general intendment of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. In other jurisdictions the
findings of Industrial Accident Commissions are given the
same weight as that accorded to the verdict of a jury or the
findings of a trial court 0 A provision for a trial de novo
from such Commissions is therefore not the generally accepted rule. Any decision that reduces the broad scope of
the Maryland rule, and vests in the Commission more
power to function as an ordinary administrative board is
desirable. It is believed that the Hathcock case produces
in part the result to be obtained.
CONSOLIDATION OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS
AGAINST PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY
CORPORATIONS
Stone, et al., v. Eacho (In re Tip Top Tailors, Inc.)'
Tip Top Tailors, Inc., a Delaware corporation, owned
and operated eight retail stores for the purpose of conducting its made-to-measure clothing business in Georgia,
New York, Ohio, Michigan, and the District of Columbia.
The business was carried on in the following manner: Customers would order from samples kept in the local stores
and the orders would be sent to the main office of the corporation which was located in Newark, New Jersey. The
garment would be made up according to specification, sent
to the store from which the order came and delivered to
the customer.
30

Comment, Review of Facts Found by Industrial Commissin#a (1938)
14 Corn. L. Q. 250-251.
1127 F. (2d) 284 (C. C. A. 4th, 1942), petition for rehearing denied, 128
F. (2d) 16 (C. C. A. 4th, 1942).
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In 1939 the Delaware company incorporated a subsidiary in Virginia, known as the Tip Top Tailors (Virginia),
Inc. The subsidiary opened a' store in Richmond and this
store was operated in exactly the same manner as the other
retail outlets of the parent corporation, none of which were
incorporated. Only three shares of stock in the subsidiary
were issued and these had a par value of one dollar and
were held by nominees of the parent. Both corporations
had the same officers and the subsidiary was, in effect,
merely a department of the parent.
The parent company furnished the new store in Richmond and supplied it with the piece goods which were to
serve as samples. All of the furnishings and fixtures
were charged at cost to the subsidiary's account which was
kept on the books of the parent and $900.00 was also contributed by the parent for current petty cash expenditures.
Except for very small items the expenses of the Richmond
store were paid by the Delaware corporation by its own
check and debited on its books to the Richmond store.
On November 20, 1940, the parent corporation was
adjudicated bankrupt in New Jersey. Several days later
creditors of the subsidiary levied attachments on the assets
in the hands'of the Virginia corporation. When the receiver of the parent learned of this he immediately filed
an involuntary petition in bankruptcy against the Virginia
corporation seeking, as a creditor of the subsidiary, to have
the latter separately adjudicated bankrupt, although the
affairs of the other retail stores were being administered in
the New Jersey proceedings. The District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia adjudged the subsidiary bankrupt and a trustee was appointed, whereupon the parent
trustee, on behalf of the creditors of the parent company,
filed a claim in the sum of $39,069.67, which figure was the
debit balance of the subsidiary's account with the parent.
The amount and the factual validity of this claim were
never seriously challenged but the trustee of the subsidiary
argued that the corporate entity of the subsidiary should
be ignored and because of the affiliation of the corporations
the claim asserted by the trustee of the parent should be
postponed to the claims of the local creditors. To meet
this objection the parent trustee, with the permission of
the New Jersey Court, filed an application for a consolidation of the subsidiary and parent proceedings, contending
that if the corporate entity should be disregarded it should
be disregarded for all purposes. This move for consolida-
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tion was actively seconded by intervening creditors of the
parent. The dispute was referred to a special master who
reported that the claim of the parent trustee should be
subordinated to the claims of the Richmond creditors. The
order of the District Court adopted the master's report and
at the same time dismissed the application for consolidation. On appeal, the order of the District Court was reversed and the case remanded so that the Virginia proceedings could be consolidated with the New Jersey proceedings against the parent company.
The keystone of the master's report was the accepted
rule that where a subsidiary corporation that is merely an
instrumentality of the parent becomes insolvent, the parent will not be allowed to share pari passu with the other
creditors of the insolvent subsidiary.2 The master recognized the distinguishing fact that in the instant case both
corporations were insolvent and the conflict was between
two sets of creditors. However, the master coupled with
the rule stated above the minor premise that the creditors
of the parent had no greater rights than the trustee and
the latter stands in the shoes of the bankrupt. From these
premises flowed the conclusion that the claim filed by the
parent trustee was not entitled to participation on a pari
passu basis.
This result was reached by adopting an unduly narrow
view of the parent-creditor's rights in a case such as this.
If the parent had remained solvent it would be inequitable
to allow it to recover its investment to the detriment of
the subsidiary's creditors; and the courts have refused such
recovery even where the parent company has made a
capital investment in the guise of a loan. But where the
parent is also insolvent there is no inequity in allowing
its creditors equal participation in the assets of the subsidiary; the fact that creditors of the subsidiary may have
been misled in extending credit, while operative against
the one who misled them, should not be operative against
the creditors of the latter. Although the report of the
master was correct from the technical point of view it
would have been less subject to challenge if both sets of
creditors had been allowed to share on a proportionately
equal basis.
The prevalence of the corporate form in general and
the break-down of the economic process into its component
parts with each function being performed by different
2 4 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY

(4th Ed.) 344.
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corporations all subject to a unified control, have resulted
in a substantial body of case law dealing with the problems
affected by the intercorporate relationship. One of the
most common questions of this type is the "turnover" situation. Where a corporation becomes insolvent and bankruptcy or receivership proceedings are instituted, should
the assets of a subsidiary be "turned over" to the trustee
or receiver of the insolvent corporation? The Courts have
made this question depend on whether the subsidiary is a
distinct entity or merely an instrumentality of the parent.
In cases where the subsidiary has no creditors, disregard
of its corporate entity is largely governed by considerations of economy and facility of administration. Where
the rights of subsidiary creditors are involved these considerations may still lead to a "turnover", but there is then
presented the question of the proper disposition of the subsidiary's assets after they have been turned over. It is
only where the parent and subsidiary are allowed to share
pari passu in the consolidated assets that the problem involves what Professor Latty euphemistically terms "intercorporate vicarious liability". 8
The instant case is closely related to the typical "turnover" case but it is further complicated by the diacritical
element that here the parent and subsidiary were in bankruptcy in different jurisdictions. Where separate proceedings are instituted in the same jurisdiction against affiliated
corporations the cases may be consolidated.4 The power
to consolidate in such cases is not derived from a specific
section of the Bankruptcy Act; it is a general power of an
equity court and is exercised mainly for the sake of expediency.
Section 32 of the Bankruptcy Act,5 as amplified by General Order 6, gives to the court -first acquiring jurisdiction
power to transfer and consolidate proceedings instituted
against the "same person" in different courts where the
transfer will best serve the convenience of the parties in
interest. These provisions are an exception to the rule
that where two courts are of equal rank and exercise concurrent jurisdiction, the court first acquiring jurisdiction
over the res shall retain exclusive jurisdiction.' This pro-

s LArry,

SUBSIDIARIES

AND AFILIATED CORPORATIONs,

' In re Alaska American Fish Co., 162 F. 498 (D.
1908) ; In re Southwestern Bridge and Iron Co., 133
1904). Cf. in re Foley, 1 F. (2d) 568 (D. C. S. D.
F. (2d) 154 (C. C. A. 10th, 1924).
511 U. S. C. (1934) 55.
a Hamilton Gas Co. v. Watters, 75 F. (2d) 176 (C.

42-54, 142-145.

C. W. D. Washington,
F. 568 (D. C. D. Kan.,
Cal., 1924) ; affirmed 4
C. A. 4th, 1935).
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vision of the Act has apparently been construed to authorize a transfer of proceedings to the court where the petition is first filed, although7 there has been no request by
that court for the transfer.
The Court in the instant case was impressed by the fact
that the subsidiary was a mere shell, possessing a charter
but having no real separate existence. Since this was so,
no effect should be given to the purely formal compliance
with the Virginia incorporation statutes. Consequently,
the Court was faced with the situation of separate bankruptcy proceedings in different jurisdictions against the
"same person". Consolidation of the Virginia proceedings
with the proceedings in New Jersey (where the first petition was filed) was practically inevitable."
There was a suggestion in the Court's opinion that the
action of the parent trustee in filing the petition against
the subsidiary was inopportune, and that it would have
been preferable to petition the District Court in Virginia
for the appointment of an ancillary receiver. It was stated
that this might have been done even after the lower Court
had assumed bankruptcy jurisdiction over the subsidiary;
that, since the parent trustee was acting as an officer of the
court, his action in filing the bankruptcy petition would
not have worked an estoppel against him. 9
The proceedings having been consolidated, the question
of priority of claims must be determined by the New
Jersey Court. 10 However, the Circuit Court of Appeals
felt that the equitable result would be to let all creditors
share pari passu in the consolidated assets.
"But in a case such as this, where both corporations
are insolvent, where the business has been transacted
by and credit extended to the parent corporation, and
where the subsidiary has no real separate existence
whatever, there is no reason why the courts should
not face the realities of the situation and ignore the
subsidiary for all purposes, allowing the creditors of
both corporations to share equally in the pooled assets"."
In re American Bond and Mortgage Co., 58 F. (2d) 379 (D. C. D. Me.,

1932).
8 Cf. Trustees System Co. v. Payne, 65 F. (2d) 103 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1933)

where it was necessary for the Court to disregard the corporate entity in

order to sustain jurisdiction.
ISee Jackson v. Lynch, 111 F. (2d) 1003 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940), affirming
In re Woodruff, 30 F. Supp. 17, cert. den. 311 U. S. 674 (1940).
10 In
this connection the Court pointed out that the Virginia creditors
were free to assert their claims to priority in the New Jersey Court.
11 Supra, n. 1.
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The existence of subsidiary creditors affects the question of turning over the assets of the subsidiary for administration in the bankruptcy proceedings of the parent; and
where the parent corporation is claiming in the bankruptcy
proceedings of the subsidiary, the fact that the parent is
also insolvent is an influential factor. As stated in the master's report, the general rule is that the parents claim will
be subordinated to the claims of the creditors of the bankrupt if the latter is merely an instrumentality of the parent.
In the celebrated "Deep Rock" case the test used was "fairness" instead of whether the subsidiary was a separate
entity or a mere sham corporation. 12 If fairness is to be
the test, the equities of the parent creditors should bar
subordination of the parent's claim where the latter is insolvent. 3 Dictum by Mr. Justice Douglas in Consolidated
Rock Products Co. v. Dubois seems to support this view.
"To the contrary, it is well settled that where a
holding company directly intervenes in the management of its subsidiaries so as to treat them as mere departments of its own enterprise, it is responsible for
the obligations of those subsidiaries incurred or arising
during its management. . . . We are not dealing here
with a situation where other creditors of a parent company are competing with creditors of its subsidiaries."'14
In the instant case the order of consolidation was clearly
sound and it is submitted that it would be ultimately desirable to allow all creditors to share equally in the pooled
assets. But the Court's preference for this result is apparently based on the supposition that the Richmond creditors
had not been misled; and that there had been no reliance
on the fact that the Richmond store had been separately
incorporated under the laws of Virginia. There was no
direct evidence on the question of reliance of local creditors. 15 The Court stressed the fact that all bills were paid
by the parent. On the other hand, the corporate name of
the subsidiary might well have led creditors to believe that
" Taylor v. Standard Gas and Electric Co., 306 U. S. 307 (1939), noted
(1941) 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1045.
" Rembar, elaim8 Against Affiliated Companie8 in Reorganizartn (1939)
39 Col. L. Rev. 907, 919.
14312 U. S. 510, 524 (1941).
This language is referred to in this connection by U. S. Circuit Judge Frank in the dissenting opinion in Geist v.
Prudence Realization Corp., 122 F. (2d) 503, 508 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1941).
1" Cf. New York Trust Co. v. Island Oil and Transport Co., 56 F. (2d)
580 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1932), where it was clear that the subsidiary creditors

had relied on the credit of the parent.
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it was an independent Virginia corporation. However, the
Court's preference may be supported by a different principle. The fact that one group of creditors was misled
should not afford them priority over another group, equally
innocent.
EFFECT OF PERFORMANCE OF PAROL TRUST OF
LAND UPON CREDITORS OF TRUSTEE
Jacobs v. Schwartz, et al.'
By deed dated June 6, 1927, A, a widower, conveyed
two lots in fee to B, who immediately reconveyed to A for
life with remainder to A's five children, C, D, E, F and G,
who orally agreed that they would reconvey their interests to A at his request. In 1929, A advised C, D, E, F, and
G that he needed money, and they joined with him in a
mortgage for $5,000, all of which went to him; and, on
September 17, 1932, they reconveyed the properties to A,
as alleged "at his request". By a series of subsequent conveyances,2 the title in fee came to the present plaintiff who,
in October 1939, agreed in writing to sell one of the properties to X. It then was discovered that on December 17,
1930, while the title to a one-fifth interest in remainder
was in C, a decree in personam, on a mortgage foreclosure
of another property, had been obtained by the Y Building
Association against C, which decree, about the same time,
was entered to the use of the present defendant, S, for
consideration paid by him. On January 16, 1940, the defendant caused an execution to be issued and levied on the
two properties in question. The plaintiff brought the
present bill against defendant, S, and the sheriff, to enjoin
the sale and quiet the title, which bill after answer and
hearing was dismissed. The plaintiff appealed. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court.
In a very brief opinion, the Court of Appeals states
the contention of the plaintiff to be that "while the deed
of 1927 is absolute in form, subject to the life estate of
Louis Jacobs,' it was really in trust because it was under*179 Md. 605, 20 A. (2d) 489 (1941).
* On September 26, 1932, A again conveyed through a straw man to himself for life with remainder in a group of six, only one of whom (G) was
in the former group. On February 19, 1938, A died. On September 5,
1939, the grantees of the deed of September 26, 1932, conveyed the lots in
question to the present plaintiff.
3 Louis Jacobs corresponds to "A" in this note's condensation of the
facts.

